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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHRYN TUCK COATS, 
Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 920588-CA 
PETER M. COATS, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND 
CROSS APPELLEE 
This brief filed by Peter Coats is in reply to the arguments 
raised by his former wife Kathryn Coats as to his original appeal 
and as to her cross appeal. Appellant believes there is a major 
distinction between these two appeals. Appellant's appeal 
concerns assertions that the lower court made mistakes in its 
ruling after certain discretionary decisions, those which could 
have gone either way, were ultimately decided by the court. 
Appellee Kathryn Tuck Coats, on the other hand, mainly urges that 
the discretionary decisions of the court are erroneous. This 
distinction will be readily seen during the discussion portion of 
this brief. 
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPROXIMATELY $148,000 IN TRUST 
DEED NOTES WERE PART OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE SUBJECT TO DIVISION WHEN SUCH 
NOTES CAME FROM NON-MARITAL FUNDS OF 
THE KIDDER-PEABODY ACCOUNT, WERE ALL 
ISSUED AFTER THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED, 
AND WERE ALL PAYABLE BACK INTO THE 
KIDDER-PEABODY FUND.
 { 
Before discussing the arguments raised by appellee Kathryn 
Coats, it is useful to briefly review the circumstances 
surrounding the Kidder-Peabody account which is the subject of
 { 
this claimed error. As noted in Appellant's opening Brief, this 
account existed prior to the marriage, was always listed solely in 
Peter Coats' name, and had been funded from Peter's grandparents.
 { 
Had this account remained entirely intact during the marriage, 
there is little doubt under this Court's previous decision that 
the account would be considered as premarital and inherited , 
property and would not be subject to division. See Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990). However, during the course of 
the marriage this account was extensively utilized by the 
appellant in his personal and business dealings. Appellee Kathryn 
Coats maintained that this type of co-mingling rendered the 
account marital property including all offsprings from such 
account. Conversely, appellant Peter Coats conceded that whenever 
money was withdrawn from the account and used for family purposes 
that such money became part of the marital estate. He maintained, 
however, that all other money which was used in his business and 
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returned into the account remained non-marital property. 
Because this account constituted some $400,000 it was a major 
item of dispute between the parties. The evidence introduced by 
both sides as to the use of this account during the marriage 
consumed a large portion of the trial and its evidence. Because 
of this dispute it was necessary to propose various alternatives 
with and without this assset considered as marital property. 
Likewise, the promissory notes which were funded by this account 
during the marriage also required double treatment. Peter Coats 
maintained that these promissory notes were exclusively his own 
property since they were derived from the Kidder-Peabody account 
and in at least half of the cases were paid directly back into the 
account. (Tr. 915). His accountant maintained that these notes 
were merely conversions into another form of the Kidder-Peabody 
account. (Tr. 1363). Appellant was aware, however, that if the 
Court ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account was marital property 
then these note receivables would also become marital property 
subject to division. For that reason appellant Peter Coats was 
forced to alternatively argue that these notes should not be 
considered at full value but should be discounted because of the 
difficulty in collecting them. (Tr. 1153-66). 
Kathryn Tuck Coats argued throughout the trial that since the 
Kidder-Peabody account was a marital asset then all notes which 
eminated from such account also became a marital asset. See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 which was Kathryn Coats proposed marital 
asset division including the Kidder-Peabody account. Moreover, 
she maintained that even if the Kidder-Peabody account itself was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
not considered a marital asset, that the notes eminating from it 
became marital property subject to division. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibt 91. 
Had the lower court ruled in favor of appellee Kathryn Coats 
that the Kidder-Peabody account was marital property, then there 
is no doubt that the promissory notes executed both before the 
divorce was finalized in 1991 and those issued after such event 
would all be subject to marital division. Simplistically, it 
would be analogous to a husband having a marital bank account 
which is utilized to purchase and keep automobiles both before and 
after the parties have been legally divorced. In such a case 
since the funds are determined to be marital property any 
conversion of such funds would likewise be marital property. 
Using this same analogy, if a court determines that such 
account is the separate property of the husband, then any 
purchases he makes that can be traceable to such funds either 
before finalization of the divorce or after would still remain his 
separate property. The mere fact that the form of the property 
has been changed does not affect the result. 
Appellant Peter Coats, therefore, could have appealed to this 
Court as to all the notes determined by the lower court to be 
marital property: those issued prior to February of 1991 and those 
issued after February 1991. However, because there was evidence 
that the proceeds of the pre-divorce notes sometimes did not go 
back into the Kidder-Peabody account but went to other funds or 
for other purposes, such an argument has not been made. In 
effect, Appellant concedes that those notes prior to his divorce 
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could be considered part of the marital assets even though the 
initial funds were derived exclusively from the Kidder-Peabody 
account. 
As to those notes that were issued after the divorce was 
final, however, there can be no room for argument. Appellant 
carefully issued each note in his real estate business to be 
payable back into "The Kidder-Peabody Account." Kathryn was no 
longer living with him and therefore there was no co-mingling of 
assets or liabilities. Once it was determined by the lower court 
that the Kidder-Peabody account was exclusively his, then it had 
to follow as a matter of law that any conversion of such funds 
into another form was also his exclusive property. Had he 
purchased five antique automobiles in June of 1991 with the 
Kidder-Peabody money it cannot be said, under any circumstances, 
that these automobiles would be subject to marital division. 
Appellant utilized the Kidder-Peabody money after his divorce 
for purely business purposes. Because of the availability of this 
money he was able to transact numerous real estate loans by 
lending buyers sufficient funds to make their purchases. This 
enabled him to receive in some cases two commissions as well as to 
receive a return on his money from the borrower. However, this 
use of the money was insignificant when compared with the fact 
that 50 percent of the value of the notes was taken from him by 
the property division. Thus, Mr. Coats was essentially penalized 
some $59,000 because he chose to use the money in the 
Kidder-Peabody account rather than letting it merely sit there 
where no claim by his former wife could be made. 
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With this background it now remains to examine the specific 
arguments raised by Mrs. Coats. 
A. The Issue Concerning These Promissory Notes 
Was Raised Below. 
Appellee Kathryn Coats has reviewed some of the testimony in 
this case concerning the promissory notes. She claims that the 
argument now raised by Appellant was not raised below. However, 
her own citations clearly show this was not the case. Appellant's 
attorney in introducing Exhibit 78 clearly stated that the purpose 
of such exhibits was to trace the funds out of the Kidder-Peabody 
account in order to show that they were separate property. (See 
Appellee's Brief, p. 9). Moreover, Exhibit 78 contained all of 
the notes that were executed after the parties had been divorced 
in February of 1991. Again, in his closing argument Mr. Larew 
clearly stated that the identity of these promissory notes had not 
been lost and had not been co-mingled with other funds. As he 
stated and as was quoted by Appellee, "The promissory notes used 
funds coming out of the Kidder-Peabody. We maintain those are the 
sole property of Mr. Coats because they have not been co-mingled 
or lost through exchange. They were clearly identified and 
readily traceable." (Tr. 1305, Appellee's Brief, p. 11). 
Appellee seems to assert that Mr. Coats was required to 
separately argue pre-separation notes from post-separation notes. 
In fact, however, as stated above, the same principle applied to 
all such notes regardless of when they were issued. If they could 
be shown to have eminated from the Kidder-Peabody account and to 
have gone directly back to it, then such notes would be the 
separate property of Mr. Coats. 
-6-
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Mr. Coats has elected, however, for purposes of this appeal 
to focus only upon the post-divorce notes to eliminate any 
arguments which could be advanced as to the ultimate use of funds 
from the pre-divorce notes. This narrowing of the issues was Mr. 
Coats' own choice for purposes of this appeal. However, the lower 
court was fully apprised of Appellant's argument that all of the 
notes, including the post-divorce notes, were the separate 
property of Mr. Coats since they were traceable from the 
Kidder-Peabody account. 
Appellee argues that because Exhibits P-90 and P-91 were 
introduced into evidence that somehow this was an admission by 
Appellant that these notes were part of the marital property. It 
is obvious, however, that both of these exhibits were the 
proposals of the appellee as to how the property should be 
classified and divided. Certainly, Appellant could make no 
objection to Kathryn Coats' proposal as to how she believed a 
division should be made. 
Likewise, the fact that Appellant listed these assets in his 
own Exhibit 59 is of no consequence since Exhibit 59 includes all 
of his assets both marital and separate. As noted by Appellee 
herself concerning the testimony relating to this exhibit, 
"Defendant did not ever testify as to what assets were not marital 
other than the Kidder-Peabody account." (Appellee's Brief, p. 9). 
For these reasons, therefore, the issue of the promissory 
notes was sufficiently raised in the lower court and has been 
preserved for this appeal. 
B. The Inclusion of $148,000 in Notes as 
Part of the Marital Estate Was Erroneous. 
-7-
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Appellee argues that the lower court correctly included all 
of these notes as marital property based upon the same arguments 
she advanced at trial that the Kidder-Peabody account itself was 
marital property. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 11-13). Of course, the 
lower court rejected this testimony and concluded that the 
Kidder-Peabody account should remain the sole property of Peter 
Coats. All of the testimony by Appellee's accountant concerned 
the use of these accounts prior to their divorce. Whatever may be 
said for those notes that were issued before February of 1991, no 
such arguments can be made as to those issued after February 1991. 
Obviously, since the parties were separated none of these 
contentions advanced by Appellee's accountant would have any 
validity after February 1991. 
C. In This Case, The Marital Estate Was 
Determined at the Time of Trial. 
Appellee maintains that Mr. Coats is arguing that the 
$148,000 in promissory notes should have been valued at the time 
of the separation and not the time of trial. (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 13-14). She relies upon Howe v. Howe, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
App. 1991) as her authority, that all assets must be valued at 
time of trial. It is questionable that the Howe case establishes 
such a rule. See Hoagland v. Hoaqland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 
1993) (Bench, J. and Jackson, J. concurring). In any event, 
however, the estate was not valued by the lower court at the time 
of the divorce but was valued at the time of trial. There is no 
doubt that both parties placed values upon the Kidder-Peabody 
account as of the time of trial. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 98; 
-8-
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Defendant's Exhibit 58). Had the lower court ruled that the 
Kidder-Peabody account was subject to marital division such 
division would have been based upon the value of the account in 
June of 1992. 
Had appellant Peter Coats not utilized any of the 
Kidder-Peabody money for his bridge loans, then the balance of 
such account as of the time of trial would have been the same 
(plus interest) as it was in February of 1991. Appellant is 
merely asking this Court to withdraw from the marital division the 
amount of the promissory notes that was wrongfully included in the 
marital division between the time of the divorce and the time of 
trial. There is no request to value these promissory notes at any 
different time period than the remainder of the estate. 
For all of these reasons, therefore, this Court should 
correct the present judgment and exclude the post-divorce 
promissory notes as a marital asset. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RECOGNIZE THE FULL AMOUNT OF DEBT THE 
DEFENDANT OWED TO HIS MOTHER ISABEL COATS. 
Appellee Kathryn Coats has been unable to cite any testimony 
of Isabel Coats in which she directly stated that the total amount 
owing by her son was $270,000. The very best attempt by Appellee 
consists of the following dialogue between Mr. Coats' attorney and 
Mrs. Coats: 
A. However, it was an open-ended note. 
Q. You did not disburse money out at all with that? 
A. The money was disbursed in increments from my Kidder 
margin account as necessary for things in the 
-9-
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development. 
Q. Now the need for the note are copies of several letters. 
Can you tell us what those are? 
A. This is what I was talking about. 
Q. Are these letters copies of letters that were written by 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they are written to Fred A. Moreton at 
Kidder-Peabody. 
A. Yes. He's my brother. 
Q. You typically deal through him in relation to your 
accounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were these written at or about the time that you got— 
the dates on these letters? 
A. These letters are dated, as far as I know, exactly. I 
would sometimes telephone, and then he would do it, and 
I followed up with a letter: but usually it was written 
in anticipation. 
Q. But these represent draws against that note, $400,000. 
A. Yes. (Tr. 981-82). (Emphasis added). 
The testimony of Mrs. Coats is entirely consistent with the 
argument now made by her son. Exhibit 50 containing the note and 
various letters attached to such note did in fact represent draws 
against the $400,000 note. She at no time, however, stated that 
these were the only draws made against the note. 
The Finding of Fact entered by the lower court, however, is 
completely inconsistent with this testimony. It states, "Isabel 
Coats testified to the Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit 
D-50 showed all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her. 
(Finding No. 14(k)(2), Findings of Fact, pp. 17-18) (emphasis 
_1 n_ 
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added). Such Finding is clearly not supported by the evidence. 
This same Finding asserts: 
"While the defendant's certified public account 
testified on the amount of the notes stated that the 
outstanding balance was $411,025, that amount was never 
verified by Isabel Coats, and the Court cannot reconcile 
in its mind the difference between the amount testified 
to by the certified public accountant and the amount 
testified to by defendant's mother, who is the creditor 
on the notes." (Id.). (Emphasis added). 
A review of the testimony of Isabel Coats shows that the 
number "$270,000" never appears in either direct examination or 
cross examination. It is not until the closing argument by 
Appellee's attorney that the assertion is made that she testified 
that Exhibit D-50 was the entire amount. The following statement 
of Appellee's attorney evidences this fact: 
Mr. Coats is bound by the testimony presented to 
the Court, and the only evidence presented by the 
defendant relating to that note was the credible 
evidence of the creditor herself. 
She said to the Court in her testimony, and D-50— 
and I ask you to look at that and add it up, and you'll 
see that this cover sheet is the note attached to it or 
letters which exhibit and evidence each loan that she 
made. 
* * * 
That Mrs. Coats testified to these letters and "all 
the evidence of all the loans I made" and the very first 
loan she said she made was a March, 1990 loan and that's 
when they began. 
And then we go through there and those add up, Your 
Honor to $270,000. And the note doesn't say $400,000, 
it says up to $400,000. (Tr. 1244-46). 
Thus, the Court essentially stated that he would have found 
the amount testified to by Appellant's accountants but for the 
fact that this testimony was in direct contradiction to the amount 
stated by the creditor herself. As can be seen, however, no such 
-11-
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contradiction occurred* 
A similar type of situation occurred in McClellan v. David, 
439 P.2d 673 (Nev. 1968). In that case a secretary in the office 
of the plaintiff's attorney testified with exactness that she had 
conversed three times with the defendant by telephone soon after 
he had been served with the summons about the necessity of his 
filing an answer to the complaint. Her recollection of the 
conversation was refreshed from written notes made by her at the 
time. The defendant did not deny the conversations, but simply 
testified he did not recall them. The trial court relieved the 
defendant of his default. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed. 
The Court held that there was no fundamental conflict in the 
testimony requiring it to adhere to the trial court's finding in 
favor of the defendant. The Court stated: 
Testimony of a witness that he does not remember 
whether a certain event took place does not contradict 
positive testimony that such event or conversation took 
place. Bender v. Roundup Mining Co., 356 P.2d 469, 
471 (1960); Tennent v. Leary, 304 P.2d 384, 387 
(1956). See also: Comment Note—Comparative Value of 
Positive and Negative Testimony, 98 A.L.R. 161. 
Therefore, we hold that there was no credible evidence 
before the lower court to show that the neglect of [the 
defendant] was excusable under the circumstances. 
Id. at 675. 
A nearly identical situation occurred in this case. 
Appellant's accountant testified with precision as to the exact 
amount that was owing on the debt, including documentation 
supporting such figure. Appellant's mother acknowledged the 
existence of the $400,000 note but did not state any amount that 
was specifically owed. At no time did she state that the draws 
contained in Exhibit 50 constituted the total amount borrowed. 
-12-
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Thus, the positive testimony of the accountant cannot be overcome 
by the neutral testimony of Appellant's mother. 
Since the findings of the lower court are not supported by 
the evidence, the judgment of the court must be modified to 
correctly reflect the entire amount borrowed by the appellant from 
his mother. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY 
CHARGING APPELLANT WITH A MARITAL ASSET 
VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON 
DEVELOPMENT WHEN SUCH FINDING WAS NOT 
BASED UPON ANY EVIDENCE. 
There is little to say about this contention of Appellant. 
Kathryn Coats has herself acknowledged that "The Court appears to 
take an arbitrary position in valuing Brandon Canyon." (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 21). The best that Appellee can do is to offer an 
alternative scenario in which a worse result could have occurred. 
This offer is simply not sufficient to overcome the fact that the 
lower court made his ruling in an arbitrary manner. Appellant 
Peter Coats could also suggest ways in which the Court's decision 
may have been reduced had he considered other formulas of 
computation. Obviously, however, neither the speculation of 
Appellant or Appellee is sufficient to overcome the absence of any 
sufficient evidence to support the finding of the lower court. 
For this reason, therefore, the decision should be vacated 
and remanded to allow the Court to make a proper evaluation based 
upon evidence as to all facets of the project which were 
unavailable at the time the Court made its ruling. 
-13-
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POINT IV 
ALTHOUGH THE COURT ORDERED APPELLANT TO 
BE GIVEN A CREDIT OF $4,300 FOR APPELLEE'S 
SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT, NO SUCH CREDIT 
WAS EVER GIVEN IN THE ACTUAL ACCOUNTING. 
Although this is a small issue in comparison to the amounts 
involved in this divorce, the approach of the appellee is 
enlightening. Rather than acknowledging that a simple mistake has 
been made and that the boat was never included in the revised 
Exhibit P-91 which serves as the basis for the accounting between 
the parties, Appellee states that Mr. Coats "will receive the 
credit when he pays the estate equalization." 
It is difficult to understand why Appellee is unable to admit 
even the simplest error. There is no doubt that paragraph 14(h) 
quoted by the appellee (Appellee's Brief, p. 22) clearly awards 
the $4,300 credit. Until this finding is included in the actual 
property distribution sheet, however, it is of no value. The 
property settlement sheet attached to the Court's decision must 
therefore be amended to reflect this $4,300 credit. Again, while 
the mistake is small it is clearly there for all to see and 
Appellee's assertion that "Appellant is mistaken regarding this 
issue" is indicative of other arguments made thoughout her brief 
which are not as apparent for their lack of substance. 
CONCLUSION AS TO APPEAL OF APPELLANT 
The issues raised by Appellant are simple, clear, and do not 
involve discretionary decisions by the lower court. Instead, they 
involve miscalculations or errors in findings which are not based 
upon the evidence existing in the record. 
Appellee has failed to refute any of these contentions and 
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therefore the relief requested should be granted. 
PETER M. COATS RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
Many of the issues raised by Kathryn Coats in her cross 
appeal are now irrelevant and moot because of changed 
circumstances. Other challenge the discretion of the lower court 
in various types of decision-making processes. These arguments 
will now be examined. 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ALLOWING 
APPELLANT TO VISIT HIS CHILDREN WITHOUT 
SUPERVISION. 
Kathryn Coats maintains that the lower court erred in failing 
to require supervised visitation as she requested. She contends 
that the Court ignored the only evidence presented to this issue 
which was offered by Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and Thomas Harrison. 
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-38). She acknowledges that Appellant 
himself testified as to his visitation desires as did Ms. Francis 
Gomez who supervised some ten visits with the children. Kathryn 
Coats fails to mention that the Court was also able to observe 
her in her testimony throughout the proceedings. Based upon all 
of this evidence the Court made the following Finding: 
The Plaintiff has requested that the defendant 
exercise visitation only in a supervised capacity. 
However, the Court is persuaded that both parties have 
problems which each of them have created for themselves 
as parents and which have affected the emotional lives 
of the children. While the Court has not interviewed 
the children, it has read the reports of the therapists, 
and it is clear that the children do have fear toward 
their father, much of which has been generated by their 
mother. The Court finds that there are two adults 
before the Court who love their children, but have 
committed acts against each other which have seriously 
-1 *-
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affected their children. There is concern about the 
father's dysfunction and the mother informing the 
children of his dysfunction. (Finding of Fact No. 2, 
pp. 2-3). 
In subsequent findings the Court observed that both parties 
needed counseling in order to rebuild their relationship with 
their children. The Court also found that there was no evidence 
to show that Mr. Coats had abused the children either physically 
or sexually or anything to indicate that he was going to abuse the 
children in any way. In addition, the Court found there was no 
evidence that the appellant was a pedophile or would engage in any 
criminal activity toward the children. (Findings 3, 4, and 5, pp. 
3-4). 
The lower court was not required to follow the 
recommendations of the alleged experts offered by Kathryn 
Coats. It is fundamental that the testimony of witnesses is to be 
given such weight and credibility as the trier of fact may find 
reasonable under the circumstances. Guinard v. Walton, 480 
P.2d 137 (Utah 1971). The Court was therefore completely 
within its authority to believe or disbelieve any portion of the 
testimony or reports offered by Appellee's witnesses. 
Moreover, now that the children reside in Virginia the 
appellant is able to see them only on infrequent occasions. This 
limited time together is an additional reason to allow 
unsupervised visits so that he can attempt to rebuild his 
relationship with his children. 
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II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
DIRECTING THE APPELLEE TO REPLACE 
MR. TOM HARRISON AS THE CHILDREN'S 
COUNSELOR. 
The trial court concluded there was a great deal of 
antagonism between Mr. Tom Harrison and the appellant. The Court 
concluded that this antagonism was anti-productive in resolving 
problems between the appellant and his children. The Court 
concluded that it would be "in the best interests of the parties 
and the children to place the children with another therapist." 
(Finding No. 7, p. 6). 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that another counselor would be more appropriate so that Appellant 
could attend counseling sessions with his children. Obviously, if 
antagonism existed between the counselor and the appellant, a 
non-productive session would likely result. 
Appellant Peter Coats is again perplexed why this issue is 
even raised in this appeal. His children and former wife now live 
in Virginia and Mr. Harrison practices in Salt Lake. Even if the 
Court had ordered Mr. Harrison to continue his therapy it is 
apparent that such relationship would have terminated upon this 
distant move. Likewise, an order reversing this decision would 
have no effect since Mr. Harrison would be physically unable to 
counsel the children at the present time. For this reason, 
Appellant believes that the circumstances have changed during the 
appeal thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no 
legal effect. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1983). 
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III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN DIRECTING THAT ALIMONY WOULD TERMINATE 
TEN YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT. 
In limiting Appellee's alimony to a ten-year period the Court 
noted that in light of the parties ages, and the potential ability 
of the appellee to earn income, the award of alimony should not be 
without a time limitation. (Finding No. 12, p. 10). 
Kathryn Coats has failed in her burden to produce facts and 
evidence showing that the decision of the lower court is 
incorrect. Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991). Certainly, 
with the substantial property award given to the appellee by the 
Court together with her age and earning ability, an award of 
$240,000 over a ten-year period cannot be said to be an abuse of 
discretion. 
Appellant Peter Coats also asserts that upon information and 
belief, Kathryn Coats was remarried in the summer of 1993 and 
therefore under Utah law any award of alimony immediately ceases. 
(§30-3-5(5), U.C.A.). Assuming that such marriage did occur then 
this issue would also be moot and not subject to appellate 
review. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE 
VALUATION OF THE NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS. 
Appellee Kathryn Coats asserts that the lower court erred in 
valuating the Northridge property at $4,500 when the only 
"evidence" was the testimony of appellant Peter Coats himself. 
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 41-42). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 contains an appraisal of the 
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furnishings by Mr. John Davis of the entire Northridge household 
of numerous individual items. This estimate by a professional 
appraiser showed a total value of all furnishings of approximately 
$7,300. Mr. Davis testified that these prices were based upon 
what he would expect to sell them for at a retail value, not what 
he would expect to buy them for. (Tr. 577). A review of this 
exhibit shows the marginal value of used furniture when it is 
being resold. For example, a queen anne style low boy in good 
condition is listed for $65.00. A JVC stereo system, multiple CD 
player, tuner, amplifier, cassette deck, turntable, and simulated 
oak cabinet is listed for $200.00. Sterling flatware in a 
mahogany silver chest with approximately 50 pieces is listed for 
$210.00. 
Appellant testified as to his opinion of certain items that 
were not listed in Exhibit 2 which he felt had been omitted. 
Appellee's counsel prepared Exhibit 80 and attempted to elicit Mr. 
Coats' admission that this was a correct value. Mr. Coats did not 
agree, however, and stated the following: 
This is a value just to show some things were left 
out. I think the way the values have gone from the 
testimony of the appraisers, they came through and they 
absolutely do a fire sale on it. So these might be a 
retail value, then from that value we would have to 
establish a market value. I don't think we talked about 
market value. We talked about what they were purchased 
for and what they are going to go through, and I just 
wanted to have a choice in the items that I received 
instead of them being hidden in Virginia. (Tr. 
1455-56). 
Based upon the testimony of Appellee's own appraiser as to 
the value of used furniture, the lower court was justified in 
concluding that the retail value suggested by the appellant was 
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only approximately one-fourth of the actual market value that 
these items would sell for in a commercial setting* Determining 
and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial 
court and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations 
absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Yelderman v. 
Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983). 
It should also be noted that the purpose of this valuation 
was to give Appellee a credit for the furniture after she had 
delivered it to Mr. Coats. As of this date, however, Mr. Coats 
has yet to receive any of the items listed on Exhibit 80. If this 
Court were to increase the valuation to $18,000 as now requested 
by Appellee, and if Appellee fails to deliver these items to 
Appellant as required, then it would be Appellant who would be 
entitled to the increased valuation credit. Thus, this contention 
of Kathryn Coats could ultimately be detrimental to her own 
financial interests. 
•  v . < • ' • + :' ' 
THE CLAIM CONCERNING TARGET CAPITAL AS 
AN ASSET IS A NON-ISSUE. 
Appellee asserts that "both parties agreed that Target 
Capital was an asset." (Appellee's Brief, p. 42). No citation is 
given for this statement. Likewise, there is no explanation as to 
any "value" stipulated by both parties or that Appellant would be 
given this as an asset. Appellant asserts that Target Capital has 
absolutely no value and therefore it is immaterial whether it 
would be given to him or to his former wife. There was no 
testimony concerning this asset since it had no value. The lower 
court was correct in completely discarding this non-existent asset. 
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VI. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO AWARD APPELLEE THE LIABILITY CLAIMED 
BY HER FATHER AS TO PROMISSORY NOTES SHE 
HAD EXECUTED. 
Appellee Kathryn Coats makes the unusual argument that she is 
entitled to be reimbursed by appellant Peter Coats for promissory 
notes that she executed to her father in the amount of $40,000. 
She acknowledges that most of this money went to attorneys1 fees 
and expert witness fees as well as living expenses. She 
subsequently makes two separate claims as will be discussed infra 
for attorney fees and witness fees. Essentially, therefore, she 
wishes Mr. Coats to pay the entire liability to her father and 
then to pay her separately for assessed attorneys fees and witness 
fees which she also claims are due. Such double dipping cannot be 
allowed. 
Appellee has cited no authority which requires a spouse to 
pay a relative of a former spouse for monetary expenses advanced. 
If her father's money was utilized for attorneys* fees and other 
reimbursable expenses, then when she receives such amount from 
Appellant she can certainly reimburse her father. This divorce 
action is clearly between Kathryn Coats and Peter Coats and not 
between Peter Coats and Kenneth Tuck, Appellee's father. 
Essentially, whatever money is due between Peter and Kathryn 
for alimony, temporary support, attorneys' fees, and witness fees, 
is irrelevant to any debt incurred by Appellee to her father. Had 
Appellee gone to a bank and borrowed money for these same expenses 
the bank could make no direct claim against Mr. Coats for payment 
of Appellee's debt. This same result applies here and the Court 
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was correct in denying any liability to Appellee's father. 
VII. 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
AWARD AS TO ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Appellant has no dispute with the legal authorities cited by 
Kathryn Coats in her Brief. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 43-44). 
Certainly, a court has wide discretion in deciding how much, if 
any, attorneys' fees should be awarded from one spouse to the 
other. Appellee maintains that "the Court made no finding on the 
total legal fees but simply ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 
of those fees, offering no explanation for the reduction and the 
failure to recognize the liability to Mr. Tuck." (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 44). This statement is incorrect. The lower court 
offered the following explanation for the attorney fee award: 
The Court would also order that—would find, first, 
that the defendant has more ability to pay the 
attorneys' fees in this matter than the plaintiff has, 
and would award attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$20,000. 
I'm not saying that this is total fees in this 
case, I'm saying that's the total amount that this Court 
would award. 
I think the attorneys' fees were generated here 
unnecessarily—I'm not putting that right; I'm saying 
that the attorneys' fees were generated necessarily, but 
I'm saying that the attorney fees had—the attorneys had 
to do work which this Court deems was unnecessary 
because either as a result of uncooperation of the 
parties or because of events that took place as far as 
the case is concerned. (Tr. 565-66). 
See also Finding No. 20 in which the Court finds that the 
appellee has incurred substantial attorneys' fees in excess of 
$40,000 and that a reasonable amount for Appellant to contribute 
to the appellee is $20,000). 
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Clearly, the Court took into account the financial need of 
the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay 
together with the conduct of both spouses in generating the fees. 
This award was not an abuse of discretion. 
VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
AWARD APPELLEE REASONABLE FEES FOR 
EXPERTS. 
The lower court denied Appellee's request for expert witness 
fees on the basis that her request was overly broad under Utah 
law. 
In addition to this legal ground, there was insufficient 
evidence before the court to justify such fees. The only evidence 
was Appellee's testimony that she had incurred these fees and 
that she wished to be reimbursed for them. Unlike the detailed 
summary of attorneys' fees offered as evidence in this case 
(see Plaintiff's Exhibit 37 as contained in Appendix of 
Respondent and Cross Appellant) there was no evidence as to the 
breakdown of the alleged expert fees or testimony that such fees 
were reasonable under community standards. This lack of 
foundation was itself sufficient for the lower court to deny these 
fees regardless of any other reason the court may have utilized. 
IX. 
DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT UNDER RECENT 
LAW THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
CHILDREN AS TAX DEDUCTIONS TO THE APPELLANT. 
In view of recent decisions by this Court and federal courts, 
Appellant acknowledges that the lower court under today's 
standards did not satisfactorily justify the award of one child as 
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an exemption on Appellant's federal tax return or two children if 
Appellee was unable to utilize such exemption on her return. 
Appellant, therefore, agrees that this provision of the 
Divorce Decree may be amended to provide that Appellee receive all 
exemptions. 
CONCLUSION 
Before this Court can justify relief to Appellee as to her 
cross appeal, it must find that the lower court abused its 
discretion in making the various awards and decisions of which 
Appellee now complains. As noted in the context of argument, some 
of these issues are now moot or irrelevant because of 
circumstances which have changed since the trial. In other 
instances, the lower court was justified in the decision based 
upon the financial status of the parties and the circumstances 
surrounding the divorce. 
With the exception of the tax exemption issue, therefore, the 
present judgment should be affirmed in its entirety as to the 
claims now being asserted by Appellee on her cross appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 1994. 
Craig S. Co^k 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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Peterson and Joanna B. Sagers, Attorneys for Appellee and Cross 
Appellant, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 this 3rd 
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